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‘i’he relationship between the amount of information processing in an Attribute: 
Learning task and autonomic activity, measured by skin conductance responrc (SCR) 
was investigated. The amount of information processing was manipulated by type of 
concept and feedback. Furthermore, the influence of practice and verbalization was 
studied. 
Three types of concepts were used: conjunction, exclusion and joint denial The 
stimuius population consisted of four three-valued dimensions. The results ishowed 
that (1) SCR did not differ among concepts: (2) SCR varied with type of feedback, 
it being smallest at blanks and largest at infirming feedback; (3) SCR was related to the 
number of confiimations preceding infumation; (4) subjects mainiy used the strategy 
‘reject hypothesis only after infumation’; (5) subjects usually selected not-yet-tested 
hypotheses; (6) practice influenced performance; (7) verbalization did not resolt in 
more efficient use of information; however, the appropriateness of the experimental set- 
up to stud,, this factor was questioned; (8) conjunction was easier to ie.srn than the other 
concepts. The results were discussed in terms of uncertainty reduction, restthing dart 
testing hypotheses in a concept learning task. 
1. Introduction 
In many (deterministic) concept learning tasks subjects are required 
to classify stimuli into two or more categories according to some 
principle or concept; rhey are instructed about the characteristics of the 
stimuli. The concepts consist of two components, the (relevant) 
stimulus attributes and the rule relating those attributes. Three types of 
tasks are distinguished: (a) the subject is only informed about the rule 
(Attribute Learning); (b) the subject is only informed about the relevant 
attributes (Rule teaming); (c) the subject is neither informed about the 
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rule nor about the relerant attributes (Complete Leamirlg). During task 
performance the subject is informed about the correctness of his 
classification (further called feedback). For the purpose of the present 
study three kinds of feedback are disringuished: (a) confirming feed- 
back, that confirms the classification of the subject; (b) infirming feed- 
back, that disconfirms the classification of the subject; (c) nonin- 
formative feedback, that gives no information about the classification 
(further called a blank). 
Stimulus-response associationists as well as mediated associationists 
account for. concept learning in terms of associations between the 
response :hat is reinforced, and the common features of the instances of 
a category. Others state, however, that subjects are testing hypotheses 
during a concept learning task. Accordingly, Levine (e.g. 1975) predicted 
that subjects change their hypotheses only after infirmative feedback, 
and not after a confirmation or after a blank. This prediction has been 
confirmed many times (e.g. Levine 1966; Aiken et al. 1972; Coltheart 
1973; Levine et al. 1975; De Swart and Das-Smaal 1976). 
Given that subjects are testing hypotheses and change their hypothesis 
only after infirmation during a concept learning task, different kinds of 
feedback should result in (a) different amounts of uncertainty reduction 
about the hypotheses and (b) different information-processing activities. 
Afte- an infirmation a subject is certain that the hypothesis under test 
was wrong; thus, he has to reject the hypothesis and select a new one. 
After confirmation subjects would not have rieason lo change the hypo- 
thesis under test; however, their confidence in such hypotheses increases 
as a function of the number of confirmations (Trabasso and Bower 
1968; Falmagne i970). The relationship between confidence and 
number of confirmations is also in agreement with the prediction of 
Bayes’ theorem, a model frequently employed in the area of opinion 
revision (e.g. Slavic and Lichtenstein 1971; De Swart 1972). A blank 
does not provide the subject with information; hence, in accordance with 
Levine, the subject does not have to change his hypothesis nor his un- 
certainty about it. On the contrary, Spence (1970) stated that a “blank 
has as much information value concerning response correctness as the 
overt reinforcer for which it stands” (p. 328). Spence found that 
subjects treat blanks as signalling correct responses. Hence, according to 
SPence, blanks and confirmations are expected to be identical in 
informational value. The first aim of the present study was to investigate 
this controversy between L’evine and Spence by using the skin conduc- 
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tance response (SCR) as independent variable. 
Frequently, differences in information processing, perc#eptual or
cognitive, are found to be accompanied by different patterns of auto- 
nomic physiological activity (e.g. Pishkin and Wolfgang 1964; Pichkin 
and Shurley 1968; Zimmermann 19’71). De Swat-t and Das-Smaal 
(1976) (excluding some methodological shortcomings in these studies) 
found in a Complete Learning task (in which subjects knew in advance 
that only a conjunction and an exclusive disjunction were possible) and 
using SCR as ,an index for autonomic physiological activity, that SCR 
was greater after infnmation than after confirmation. Given this result, 
it is predicted from Spence’s (1970) theory that SCR after a blank will 
not differ from SCR after confimting feedback. However, according to 
the strategy “reject hypothesis only after intirmation” SCR after a 
blank should be smaller than after confirming feedback because of the 
difference in informational value. 
In the study of De Swart and Das-Smaal (1976) it was also found (a) 
that SCR increased with increasing difficulty of the conceptual rule and 
(b) that SCR at intirming feedback increased with the number of 
previous confirmations. The latter finding was in accordance with 
Trabasso and Bower (1968) and Falmagne (1970) and was interpreted 
in terms of Sokolov’s (1969) model of the orienting reflex, which 
predicts an increasing SCR with increasing discrepancy between the 
expected and the actual situation. Sokolov employed Bayes’ theorein to 
evaluate at the neural level “the change in the probabilities of the 
hypotheses as a result of distinst signs which occur from an object” 
(1969; p. 688). 
De Swart and Das-Smaal’s (1976) result that SCR was larger after 
infirmation than after confirmation could not be unambiguously 
ascribed to a difference in uncertainty reduction alone. An explanation 
is possible either in terms of differences in uncertainty reduction, or in 
terms of differences in information-processing activities, resulting from 
each type of feedback, or both. The same holds for the difference in 
SCR bel:ween the conjunction and exclusive disjunction, which could 
have been caused by a difference in infomlation-processing activities, 
resulting from the difference in degree of difficulty between the LWO 
rules. An explanation in terxns of differences in uncertainty reduction 
between the conceptllal rules is, however, also possible. De Swart and 
Das-Smaal (1976) found that the two conceptual rules do not have a 
uniform subjective p:j.obability distribution : the prior probability of 
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selecting a conjunctive hypothesis was higher thy the probability of 
selecting an exclusive disjunctive hypothesis. If SCR primarily indicates 
uncertainty reduction, then differences in SCR among rules must dis- 
appear when differences in prior probabilities between the different 
rules are equa_&. This prediction was tested in the present Study, Using 
an Attribute Learning task, by which uncertainty about the rll.es was 
caucelled out. Three different rules were employed: conjunction, 
exclusion and joint denial. Haygood and Boume (1965) found for an 
Attribute Leaming task that joint denial was more difficult to learn than 
conjunction; exclusion was not investigated in that study. 
Two other Isources, in’hrencing the performance in COriCept learning 
tasks, were studied in the present experiment: the effect of practice and 
verbalization. 
De Swart and Das-Smaal (1976) found Zhat in only 2% of the cases 
subjects changed their hypothesis after confirmation, whereas after 
infirrnation they changed to an other hypothesis in 97% of the cases, 
and of these 88% had not yet been tested. This result is in accordance 
with Levine (1966). Coltheart (1973) also found a similar result ,with 
repect to intirming feedback, but in her experiment hypotheses were 
changed after 23% of the confirmations. She supposed that the dis- 
crepancy between her data and Levine’s partly reflects the difference 
between practiced and unpracticed subjects, a suggestion supported by 
White (1974) who found that trained subjects are more apt to use the 
strategy “reject hypothesis only after mflrmation”. In the above- 
mentioned study by De Swart and Das-Smaal (1976), however, un- 
practiced subjects were found to apply this strategy quite consistently. 
Nonetheless, in accordance with Coltheart (1973), it is hypothesized 
that the strategy should be applied more consistently with increasing 
practice. If practice is the only factor which influences consistent use 
cf the strategy, the effect of practice should SLOW up, independent of 
the conceptual rule in the learning task. This prediction was tested in 
the present study, 
Karpf and .Levine (197 1) did not find a difference in performance 
between Levine’s blank procedure used to identify the hypothesis held 
by the subject and .#erbalization of the hypothesis ‘by the subject him- 
self. Dominowski (19731, however, proposed that overt verbalization of 
the hypothesis leads to a more efficient use of the available information. 
The present study investigated the effect of verbalization of the 
hypothesis. In accordance with Dominowshi’s (1973) position it is 
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predic’.ed (1 j that verbalization leads to faster problem solving (a smaller 
number of trials to critekn) and (2) that SCR will be smaller in the 
case of non-verbalization than in case of verbaliza.tion because of a less 
efficient use of the information. From Karpf and Levine’s (1971 j study 
such differences in number of trials to criterion and in SCR are not 
predicted. 
2. lhe experiment 
2.1. Task 
Three Attribute Learning tasks were emp!oyed which required the learning of a 
conjunction (TT), an exclusion (TF) and a joint denial (FF). Each S received three 
problems, each representing one type of task. The Ss were divided into three groups 
corresponding to three orders of presentation: TT, TF, FF; TF, FF, TT; FF, TT, 
TF. 
Within each group half the Ss received feedback on each trial (loo%), the other 
half received feedback in 67% of the cases (67%). 
Within each of these six groups one half of the Ss had to verbalize their hypo- 
thesis (V), the other half were not requested to state their hypotheses (V). The 
tasks were terminated for the verbalization group either when S had correctly 
classified five successive stimuli and mentioned the correct concept or, if this did 
not occur, sfter 40 trials. The criterion to terminate a task for the nonverbalization 
group was eleven successive correct classifications or after 4G trials. 
2.2. Subjects 
Twenty-four female and twenty-four male Ss participated in the experiment. 
Twelve female and twelve male Ss were psychology freshmen, whose participation 
was considered part of their training. The other half of the Ss were student volun- 
teers, who were paid Dfl. 10 nc! (about $4.00) per horn for their participation. 
2.3. Stimulus material 
The stimulus material consisted of slides showing geometrical figures. Four 
three-valued dimensions were used. Each slide contained one value of each 
dimension: shape (square, circle or diamond), shad.mg within the shape (huri- 
zontal, vertical or diagorsl), location on the slide (high, middle, low), and stgn 
(+, -, X) in the middle of the shape. Thus, the stimu!us population consirted of 
8 1 different slides. 
The feedback slides showed the words ‘positive’, ‘negative or ‘unknown’. 
2.4. Apparatus 
The experimental room was dimly illuminated and soundproof. A projector 
(Carousel Model Type 2) was located outside the room. Stimuli and feedback 
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slides were projected on a frosted glass window in front of s. Next to the window 
a card was ws~pen&d, showing the code which Ss had to use when formulating their 
hypotheses about the conl::pt. Ss who had to state their hypotheses aloud, did SO 
via a microphone. Their hypotheses were written down by the experimenter. Stimuli 
had to be assigned to one of two response categories: the positive or the negative 
category. Ss had to give their categorization responses by pressing one of two 
buttons, a positive or a negative one. These were fixed to the arm rest of S’s chair 
within the reach of his preferred hand. Responses were recorded automatically 
with the aid of a Beckman S-cha:~nel polygraph (type R 411 dynograph). 
Timer impulses to the projector and the SCR were also recorded on this poly- 
graph. Basic level SCR was messured DC and specific SCR’s were measured AC by 
a constant 0.5 V v&age bridge. AC responses were registered with a time constant 
of 3 sec. Ag/AgCMectrodes, 7.5 mm in diameter, were attached to the volar sur- 
face of the distal phalanx of the second and third finger of the S’s nonpreferred 
hand. Agar-agar paste with a 0.067 M KC1 solution was used. 
2.5. Procedure 
After informing S about the experimental equipment, the recording leads were 
attached and S was seated i.t the soundproof room. Sample slides were shown 
containing each of the dimensional values at least once. Then s was given instruc- 
tions as to the nature of the task. the responses required, and the meaning of the 
feedback. !n the 67% feedback condition Ss were told that two types of feedback 
would be given, w.th information (positive or negative) and without information 
(unknown). It was explained that the latter type of feedback contained no informh- 
tion about the correctness of S’s response. A training task was given followed by 
five minutes rest. Then the three experimental tasks were presented in succession, 
separated by rest-intervals of approximately three minutes duratmn. Each task was 
terminated at criterion. At the beginning of each task S was told which conceptual 
rule was applicable. 
The trials of the experimental tasks were composed as follows: stimulus presen- 
tation (12 set), after which&’ had to give his categorization response (plus or minus) 
immediately; seven set after the stimulus offset, feedback (positive, negative or 
unknown) was shcwn during five sec. After a five set rest interval, the verbalization 
Ss had to state their hypothesis about the concept. This had to be done within 
13 set, which was indicated by a green light. Then, after a further interval of four 
set, the next stimulus was presented. Following the feedback, the non-verbalization 
group was given six set rest, after which the next stimulus was shown. 
The order of presentation of the stimuli within each task was the same for each 
S. But each task had a different order. This order was determined at random, with 
the following restrictions: (1) only onevalue in the stimulus sequence would change 
at a time; (2) 50% of the presented stimuli were instances of the concept; (3) in the 
100% as well as the 67% feedback condition the order of the feedback slides was 
the same for each of the three tasks; (4) and for an optimal information processor 
the sixth trial of each task reduced the number of possible hypotheses to one. In 
the 67% feedback condition, the blanks and the positive anti negative feedback 
appeared equally often. 
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For each task, independent groups received different problems constructed to 
employ each dimension at least once. Two different problems were used for each 
task. 
2.6. Quantification of data 
SCR was measured as the greatest conductance change (ASC), beginning between 
one and four se: after the onset of the feedback. To reduce individual differences 
in SCR reactivity the change in log conductance (A log C) was calculated and taken 
as a measure for the SCR. 
Dependent on the response (and hypothesis for the verbalizatieon group) of the 
S, different types of feedback were distinguished; in the 100% condition: con- 
firming and infirming feedback; in the 67% condition: confirming, infirming and no 
feedback. 
The data were processed by means of ANOVA. A consequence of the number of 
blank trials in the 67% condition was, that Ss received a maximum of 27 trials per 
problem, i.e. trials from which they could learn, instead of a maximum of 40 trials 
as indicated by the criterion. Hence number of trials io criterion (TLE) and number 
of errors (NE) were based on 27 trids at most, excluding the blanks. All analyses 
involved factorial designs, in which the factor ‘Ss’ was treated as a random effect, 
and all other factors were treated as fixed effects. Differences between the means 
were evaluated by means of Duncan’s new multiple range test (Edwards 1960). 
3. Results 
In a previous analysis no differences between paid and unpaid Ss turned up, 
therefore the data were not further analyzed with respect to thL variable. Tab!c 1 
summarizes the means of each dependent variable for the main sources. 
3.1. Triais to criterion and number of errors 
The number of Ss who did not solve the problem within 27 learning trials, were 
2, 15 and 20 for TT, ‘TF and FF, respectively. TT differed significantly from TF 
and FF (Cochran Q test; Q = 19.58, p < 0.001; Q := 29.45, p < 0.001, respectively): 
TF and FF did not differ significantly (Co&ran Q test: Q = 1.43, p > 0.05). 
Columns 1 and 2 of table 1 show trials to criterion (TLE) and numher of errors 
(NE), respectively. TLE and NE were highly correlated (7 = 0.85, p <I 0 001). From 
all sources and interactions only Tasks yielded a s&nifi,%:ant F va!?ie for TLE (F 
(2,48) = 15.77, p < 0.001) as well as for NE (F(2,48) = 25.02, ,?I < ~XOwl); TT was 
significantly lower than TF and FF @ < O.Ol), whereas TF and FF did not differ 
significantly (p > 0.0s). 
An ANOVA based on a maximum of 40 trials (NE in the 67% condition included 
the blanks) resulted in a significantly higher biE in the 67% than in the 100% condi- 
tion (jz = 8.69 and, -k = 6.47, respectively; F(1,24) = 5.23, p < 0.0s) and a nearly 
significant difference in the same drrection .in TLE between the two conditions 
(X = 20.26 and X = 15.74, for 67% and lOO%, respectively; F(l,24) = 3.65, p = 
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Table 1 
The mean values of the main effects for each of the dependent 
variables. 
- - 
Main sources Dependent variables 
Trials to Number of Skin conductance 
criterion errors response 
100% 67% 
Verbalization 
V 13.40 
5 13.74 
Percentage of feedback 
67% 12.51 
100% 14.63 
Order of presentation 
l-T, TF, FF 14.73 
TF, FF, T-T 13.29 
FF,l-T,TF 12.69 
SLX 
male 14.06 
female 13.Q8 
Type of feedback 
blank - 
confumation - 
infinnation - 
Tasks 
T-T 
TP 
FF 
7.27 
15.40 
18.04 
5.90 34.97 
5.04 45.44 
5.43 38.04 
5.51 42.38 
5.90 34.56 
5.29 41.46 
5.23 44.60 
5.54 41.25 
5.40 39.17 
- 
- 38.45 
- 48.53 
2.48 36.92 
6.08 40.38 
7.85 43.33 
31.81 
44.80 
- 
40.71 
32.83 
41.38 
39.62 
39.99 
28.19 
36.99 
49.74 
36.82 
36.20 
41.90 
0.07). This was a plausible result; for the 67% condition provided less information 
than the lOG% one, hence more learning trials were necessary and the probability 
of making an error was higher in the 675; than in the 100% condition. 
In 96% cf the trials Ss behaved according to the optimal strategy ‘reject hypo- 
thesis only after infumation’. Following a confvmation a new hypothesis was 
selected ia 22, and following a blank in 14% of the cases, whereas following an 
infmation, the hypothesis was altered in 91% of the cases. Ss applied the opti- 
mal strategy less consistently in the first task than in the other two tasks; 46% of 
the inconsistencies were m.sde during th,e solution of the first task. 
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3.2. Skin conductance response 
The overall ANOVA did not show any significant SCR ditferences among V and 
v, 100% and 67%, the different orders of presentation, sexes and tasks. The dat? 
yielded a significantly higher SCR at infirming than at confirming feedback (F( 1 ,~LI 1
= 13.55, P < 0.001). An analysis within the 67% condition resulted in a significant 
difference among no (blank), confirming and infirming feedback (F(2,24) = 14.98, 
P < 0.001); SCR at a blank was significantly lower than at confirmation (p < 
0.05), which was in turn significantly lower than at infiimation (p < 0.01). 
The overall ANOVA resulted in several significant interactions with Sex; Verbali- 
zation X Sex (F( 1,24) = 6.89, p < 0.05), Type of feedback X Sex (F(1,24) = 4.49, 
p < 0.05) and Verbalization X Type of feedback X Sex (F(1,24) = 4.28, p < 0.05). 
In the ANOVA within the 67% condition Verbarization X Sex turned out to be 
significant (F( 1,12) = 9.47, p < 0.01) as well as Verbaliza?ion X Type of feedback 
X Sex (F(2,24) =: 3.70, p < 0.05). 
These significant interactions resulted from a difference in performance of men 
and women with respect to the verbalization variable. Within the 67% condition 
women reacted ,vith a higher SCR during the V than during the v condition, where- 
as men reacted in the opposite direction. Furthermore, within the 100% condition 
only the women showed the tendency toward a. lower SCR at confirmation than at 
infirmation. Within the 67% condition both sexes showed the overall effect of a 
lower SCR after confirma.tion than after infiimation. 
The only other significant interaction turned out to be Order of presentation 
X Tasks (F(4$,48) = 6.69, p < O.Ol), which interaction actually deals with the order 
in which the concepts were learned. Learning a concept later ir the experimental 
session resulted in a smaller SCR value (p < 0.01; xi = 57.05, xr = 40.09, x3 = 
33.32). This tendency held for TT and FF, but not for TF; SCR during learning the 
second concept was smaller than during iearning the third one, but both SCR values 
were smaller than during learning the first concept. Hence, it was concluded that 
the decrease of SCR during the experiment resulted from habituation. 
The effect of habituation was further analyzed by vincenttiing each of the tasks 
(in equal parts for each S) to correct for the difference in number of trials between 
Ss. SCR decreased significantly throughout TT and FF, but not during TF (Friedman 
two-way analysis of variance; X2 = 22.87, df = 2, p <0.001:X2 = 4.14, df = 2, 
p<o.05;x2 = 2.57, df= 2, p = 0. I?, respectively). 
The lack of difference in SCR between tasks could have been caused by habitua- 
tion because of the different number of trials required for solution. Therefore, the 
same number of trials for each task was analyzed by using the number of trials of 
the task with fewest trials. This analysis showed a tendency for SCR to be smaller 
during TT’than during FF (sign test; 0.05 C p < 0.10); the other comparisons 
(TT-TF and TF-FF) did not reach significance. Corre ations 
I 
between SCR and 
number of trials yielded a trend toward a positive relat,onship only for TT (rs = 
0.19;~ = 0.09); the other correlations were not significant. 
To determine the relationship between the number of previous confirmations 
of a hypothesis and SCR after infirmation of that hypothesis, the SCR data within 
the V condition were classified into four categories in accordance aith the number 
of c&e&y precdng wnfirmations of a hypothesis (0, 1, Z ami > 3). SC! boned 
out to increase with increasing umber of confirmations before infirmation within 
t& liJ@% condition, but not within the 67% CCIIT~~~~OII (Friedman tar~-~ay an@& 
~f~~e;~2=~O.~5,~~=3,p<0.00f;~2=I.66,~f~~3,p>0.10,respect~~e~~). 
4. Discnssion 
From Levine (1975) it was predicted that, if subiects perform in 
accordance with the optimal strategy Yeject hypothesis only after infx- 
mation’, their hypothesis testing behavior foIlowing a b!ank or ~cnf~kma- 
t&m should not differ_ However, blanks and confirmations should iiiffer 
with respect to their informational value. With respect to the fir5t 
prediction the data showed th3t subjects usually performed in accordance 
with the optimal strategy. The second prediction was also supported by 
the data: ablankresulted in a smaller SCR than a conf?irmation, which is 
inconsistent with Spence’s (1970) hypothesis that blanks and confirma- 
tions have identicaI informational value. The differences in departure 
;rom the optimal strategy which turned up between blanks and con- 
fmations can not be put forward, however, as evidence for Levine’s 
thesis that the use of the optimal strategy is the same after blanks and 
af’telr corrfumations. Subjects violated the optimal strategy more often 
after bIa.nks th,an after confirmations. dthough no significant diffzences 
turned up in TE and NE. Furthermore, SCR after infinnation in the 
67% condition turned out not to vary with the number of preceding 
confhmatiom, whereas this relationship did hold for the Io(% condition. 
Perhaps the simpIest way to consider these results is to postulate an 
inclina.tion to lapse into a passive state after a blank, as done by Falmagne 
(1%‘0:1 and A&en et al. f I 972), in which the subject is more apt to 
respond by chance, while this has no effect on the learning process per 
se. 
The number of subjects solving the problems, ‘I’LE and NE showed a 
differeace between tasks: a conjunction (TX’) was easier to Iearn than an 
exc&:on (ml and a joint denial (FF). The difference between ‘IT and 
F’F is 31 accordance with fEdin@ by Haygod and hume ( 1’965). TE 
and FF did not differ, however. This may have been caused by the 
criterion used; the maximum number of trials was perhaps too ~III~II for 
such a difference to show ug’. 
The SCR data did not show a difference between TI, TF and FF. 
This lack of difference in SCR between tasks was predicted from the 
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hypothesis that SCR primarily reilects uncertainty reduction and not 
information-processing activities during a concept learning task. Jhe 
lack of difference cannot be explained by the habituation effect, because 
comparing SCR for equal numbers of trials of the tasks also yielded no 
significant differences between tasks. 
The hypothesis that SCR is primarily an index of uncertainty reduc- 
tion is further evidenced by two other results. Firstly, an increasing 
number of confirmations preceding infvnration resulted in an increase 
of SCR. This finding replicated the fmding of De Swart and Das-Smaai 
(1976), and is in agreement with Sokolov’s (1969) model of the orienting 
reflex, as well as with Trabasso and Bower (1968) and Falmagne ( 1970). 
Secondly, SCR turned out to be lower after blanks than after con- 
firmations, while infirmations resulted in the largest SCR values. 
Given that subjects employ a hypothesis testing strategy to identify 
the concept, it is evident that after each confirmation confidence that 
the true hypothesis is selected increases. Furthermore, after an infirma- 
tion the subject is certain that the selected hypothesis is wrong. In the 
case of blanks the prior probabilities are not changed. It is easy t.o show 
from Bayes’ theorem that in a deterministic concept learning task the 
mean change in confidence (probability) at confirming feedback is always 
smaller than the mean change at infirming feedback, if the conditional 
probability of a confmation, given the subject has the wrong hypothesis 
in mind, exceeds 0.50. In the present experiment he value exceeds 0.50 
in each task. So, Bayes’ theorem predicts the same order of changes in 
confidence as was found in the SCR data. 
By using blanks, a parsimonious habituation explanation of the results 
of De Swat-t and Das-Smaal(1976) and of the present study is avoided. 
In both studies the number of confirmations was higher than the 
number of infumations, hence the dift iences in SCR values could have 
been caused by a difference in likelihoods. in the present study the 
number of confirmations exceeded the number of blanks, which in turn 
exceeded the number of infirmations. A habituation explanation would 
predict in such a case lower SCR values after confirmations than after 
blanks. The opposite order was, however, obtained in the present study. 
With respect .to the effect of practice the data showed (1) that, in 
the majority of cases, subjects performed in accordance with the 
optimal strategy ‘reject hypothesis only after infirmation’; (2) that 
solving the first problem resulted in some positive transfer, resulting in 
a more consistent usage of the optimal strategy in the two succeeding- 
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problems. Hence, practice turned out to result in positive transfer, which 
was independent of the task. This result is in accordance with Coltheart’s 
suggestion (1973) and with White (1974). Coltheart, however, found a 
higher percentage of inconsistencies, which was mainly caused by the 
inconsistencies after confirmation. This is in contrast with the present 
data, which reveded a higher degree of consistency throughout the 
experiment as well as the lowest percentage of inconsistencies after 
confirmation. This difference in results may have been caused by 
differences in experimental set-up: (1) in Coltheart’s study subjects 
had to learn an affirmation; (2) the number of confirmations and in- 
formations may have been different for the two studies; (3) Coltheart’s 
feedback evaluated the response; in the present study the actual cate- 
gory was shown. It is unlikely that the difference was caused by a dif- 
ference in stimuius population, for the same tendency was found by 
De Swart and Das-Smaal(l976) who, like Coltheart (1973), employed 
four two-valued dimensions. 
Dominowski’s finding (1973) that overt verbalization of the hy- 
pothesis leads to more efficient use of the available information was 
not replicated in the present study; no overall differences between 
verbalization and non-verbalization were demonstrated for any of the 
dependent variables. This agrees with Karpf and Levine ( 197 l), who did 
not find a difference between Levine’s blank procedure and verbalization 
of the hypothesis by the subjects. However, the possibility remains that 
an opposite tendency was working. It can be argued that, as a conse- 
quence of having to verbalize a hypothesis, the subjects were inclined 
to use a suboptimal part-scanning strategy instead of the optimal 
wholist or focussing strategy (Bruner et al. 1956), whereas they may 
have employed a more optimal strategy in the case of non-verbalization. 
in the present study as well as in the study of De Swart and Das-Smaal 
(1976) subjects used a suboptimal strategy. They stated a two-valued 
concept every time, although they were not explicitly instructed to do 
so. If both this and Dominowski’s uggestion (1973) hold, no difference 
between the V and V condition needs to show up, because the two 
opposite tendencies could have neutralized each other. Hence, the 
present study die: not offer a critical test to evaluate Dominowski’s 
suggestion (1973). 
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